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Abstract
Background: Priority setting in health care is a challenge because demand for services exceeds available
resources. The increasing demand for less invasive surgical procedures by patients, health care institutions
and industry, places added pressure on surgeons to acquire the appropriate skills to adopt innovative
procedures. Such innovations are often initiated and introduced by surgeons in the hospital setting.
Decision-making processes for the adoption of surgical innovations in hospitals have not been well studied
and a standard process for their introduction does not exist. The purpose of this study is to describe and
evaluate the decision-making process for the adoption of a new technology for repair of abdominal aortic
aneurysms (endovascular aneurysm repair [EVAR]) in an academic health sciences centre to better
understand how decisions are made for the introduction of surgical innovations at the hospital level.
Methods: A qualitative case study of the decision to adopt EVAR was conducted using a modified
thematic analysis of documents and semi-structured interviews. Accountability for Reasonableness was
used as a conceptual framework for fairness in priority setting processes in health care organizations.
Results: There were two key decisions regarding EVAR: the decision to adopt the new technology in the
hospital and the decision to stop hospital funding. The decision to adopt EVAR was based on perceived
improved patient outcomes, safety, and the surgeons' desire to innovate. This decision involved very few
stakeholders. The decision to stop funding of EVAR involved all key players and was based on criteria
apparent to all those involved, including cost, evidence and hospital priorities. Limited internal
communications were made prior to adopting the technology. There was no formal means to appeal the
decisions made.
Conclusion: The analysis yielded recommendations for improving future decisions about the adoption of
surgical innovations. ese empirical findings will be used with other case studies to help develop guidelines
to help decision-makers adopt surgical innovations in Canadian hospitals.
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Background
Innovations in surgery, such as open-heart surgery, organ
transplantation and minimally invasive procedures, con-
tinue to benefit patients worldwide. A surgical innovation
can be defined as a new "intervention that is not viewed by
the institution, community or profession as meeting the
accepted standards of safety, reliability and familiarity with
effects, side effects and complications" [1]. In an attempt to
improve an existing technique, implement a new technol-
ogy or enhance institutional productivity, surgical innova-
tions are often introduced by individual surgeons under
independent circumstances. As a result of this ad-hoc
approach, no mechanism exists to capture and share what
has been learned from these experiences [2]. Decision-
making processes for the adoption of surgical innovations
have not been well studied, and a standard process for the
introduction of surgical innovations in hospitals does not
exist.
The demand for less invasive approaches to surgical pro-
cedures by patients, health care institutions, and industry,
places increased pressure on surgeons to acquire the
appropriate skills to adopt innovative procedures. Pres-
sure to adopt new technologies within departments can
make decision-making for these innovations challenging.
Individual surgeons are usually not in a position to make
judgments about collective resource allocation, and may
exert pressure for the implementation of innovations out-
side the usual institutional decision-making process. Sur-
geons often adopt new technologies into practice despite
poor evidence regarding the efficacy of an innovation [3].
Even when evidence supports an innovation, practitioners
may not always choose to adopt it. For example, percuta-
neous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA), an
alternative to coronary artery bypass grafting that relieves
narrowing and obstruction of the coronary arteries, expe-
rienced slow adoption rates in some hospitals despite
strong supporting evidence [4].
With the emergence and rapid diffusion of new surgical
technologies, there is an increasing need to prioritize and
contain costs to ensure the sustainability of the health care
system [2,5,6]. In addition to requiring that treatments
have some scientifically sound basis, [7], public account-
ability is an important consideration when resources
might be diverted from other causes [8]. Decision-makers
in Canadian healthcare institutions must balance the ben-
efits of using a new technology against cost and risk to
patient safety, in a context where reliable data are scarce.
In other words, a method of priority setting is required for
the adoption of new surgical technologies [9].
Priority setting is a challenge for every health care system
because demand for health services outweighs available
resources. As a result, hospital decision-makers are forced
to set priorities for providing access to health care services.
In every health system, decision-makers must ensure that
they achieve two key goals in priority setting: legitimacy,
defined as the moral authority to make allocation deci-
sions about available resources [10]; and fairness, which
is achieved when an individual has sufficient reason to
accept a priority setting decision because of the acceptabil-
ity of the decision-making process [11]. Legitimacy and
fairness are related in that decision-makers' legitimacy
may be enhanced by their commitment to the use of a fair
decision-making process. Before evaluating the legitimacy
and fairness of priority setting, it is beneficial to first
understand how these decisions are currently made [12].
Understanding these experiences will provide insight on
the varying adoption patterns and provide guidance for
addressing the challenge of priority setting in surgery. Sur-
gical innovations face different challenges than other
healthcare innovations such as pharmaceutical agents. For
example, there is less government regulation of surgical
procedures and devices than drugs, and there may be
greater budgetary constraints and lack of research to sup-
port surgical procedures and devices. Until now, decision-
making processes for adopting surgical innovations have
not been well studied.
The purpose of this paper is to describe and evaluate the
adoption of a new health technology used by surgeons for
the treatment of aortic aneurysms called endovascular
aneurysm repair (EVAR). This surgical innovation posed
unique economic and ethical challenges for the institu-
tion. Results from this study will contribute to the devel-
opment of guidelines to help decision-makers in relation
to future surgical innovations in Canadian hospitals.
Methods
Study Design
We used qualitative case study research methods to study
the introduction of EVAR in an academic health sciences
centre. A case study is "an empirical inquiry that investigates
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context" [13].
Since the adoption of surgical procedures is complex, con-
text-dependent and influenced by social processes, these
methods are appropriate [14].
Setting
The case study was conducted at a large, urban university
academic health sciences centre with approximately 500
patient beds in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. In the province
of Ontario, hospitals are funded by the provincial Minis-
try of Health and Long-Term Care with an annual global
budget. Certain health programs are funded under special
agreements between the hospital and the province. Resi-
dents of Canada are entitled to universal coverage of all
medically necessary health services [15], however, deci-
sion-makers in the health system are constantly strugglingBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:182 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/182
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to determine which services are 'medically necessary' and
therefore eligible for publicly funded coverage.
Case Description
Endovascular Aneurysm Repair (EVAR) is a new surgical
technology for repair of abdominal aortic aneurysms
(AAA) involving the insertion of a prosthetic graft into the
site of an aneurysm using catheters inserted through the
femoral artery. An aneurysm is an abnormal dilatation of
a blood vessel. AAAs are life threatening because of their
potential for rupture. The traditional treatment for high-
risk AAAs is surgical repair, with reconstruction of the
dilated aorta using prosthetic material. Since these major
operations are usually performed in elderly patients with
atherosclerosis and other medical co-morbidities, there is
a substantial risk of death and serious complications asso-
ciated with surgery [16]. Endovascular placement of a cov-
ered stent through a percutaneous transfemoral approach
to exclude the abdominal aortic aneurysm has recently
emerged as an alternative to open surgical repair, since it
can be done in a radiology suite without a general anes-
thetic [17,18]. Although the risks, costs and outcomes of
this novel approach were uncertain at the time when deci-
sions about adoption were being made in the late nineties
[19], some 25,000 had been performed in the United
States [18]. Key potential benefits of EVAR were faster
recovery and decreased length of hospital stay. Key con-
cerns were its relatively high cost of approximately
$10,000 US per device [20-22] and lack of evidence
regarding safety and effectiveness.
Sampling Techniques
Sampling of participants was conducted using purposive
and theoretical sampling techniques. Purposive sampling
allows us to sample a homogeneous sample of partici-
pants who will be able to describe their experiences
related to the study question. The first participant selected
was the surgeon who introduced the innovation to the
hospital. Additional participants were contacted directly
through their known involvement with the innovation
and others were identified by other interviewees – this
tends to result in a homogeneous sample, important in
the initial phases of developing the theory [23]. Theoreti-
cal sampling involves selecting individual participants
based on concepts that emerge from the data as the data
are being collected. Analysis was done concurrently with
the interviews, which helped in generating new concepts
that further directed data collection in subsequent inter-
views [24]. This combination of sampling techniques
helped ensure a diversity of experiences was captured
based on actual experience with the innovation. Sampling
decisions were made concurrently with data analysis until
theoretical saturation was reached, when additional infor-
mation was not forthcoming from further interviews. The
sampling frame included surgeons, nurses, and decision-
makers involved in hospital priority setting decisions.
Data Collection
Interviews were conducted with individuals identified to
have the most involvement with the innovation (3 vascu-
lar surgeons, 1 hospital decision-maker, 1 radiologist).
Two interviewers collected data using a semi-structured
interview format with open-ended questions. An inter-
view guide was developed and revised in light of data col-
lected and emerging findings [25]. Four of the interviews
were conducted in person and one by teleconference and
all were audiotaped. Interview participants were asked to
describe their experience with the decision-making proc-
ess regarding implementation of this surgical innovation.
We also analyzed relevant documents including the hos-
pital's Strategic Fiscal Reports.
Data Analysis
Tape recordings were transcribed verbatim as text docu-
ments and then uploaded into software designed for qual-
itative data management and analysis (QSR International,
NVivo 2.0). Analysis consisted of a modified thematic
analysis using open, axial and selective coding [25]. Open
coding involves familiarization of the researcher with the
data and identifying 'chunks' of data that relate to an idea.
Data are read line-by-line and coded using a term that best
represents the idea. Axial coding involves organizing the
codes into thematic categories. Similar ideas were organ-
ized into overarching themes. The two interviewers inde-
pendently coded the first set of interviews and
discrepancies were compared and resolved to establish a
uniform coding system. The coded transcripts were then
sorted into emergent themes and compiled into a single
document. These data were used to generate a description
of the decision-making process involved in implementing
EVAR at the hospital and this description was evaluated by
comparing it to the conditions of the 'Accountability for
Reasonableness' framework (described below). Compli-
ance with the framework was considered 'good practice'
and instances where the conditions were not met were
considered 'opportunities for improvement'.
We used several strategies to enhance the validity of our
analysis. Codes connected to original quotations in the
source material provided traceability or grounding. As a
'member check', we provided participants with an oppor-
tunity to view verbatim transcriptions, written interpreta-
tions and reports to confirm their accuracy. To increase
the theoretical sensitivity of the study [24], the interview-
ers reviewed the literature on surgical innovations and the
theoretical framework. The interviewers recorded memos,
notes and reflective thoughts during periods of data col-
lection and analysis. The data were then transcribed either
as short notes or verbatim for periodic discussion with theBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:182 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/182
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research team (peer debriefing). Transcripts and docu-
ments were dually coded and a mutual coding list was
developed to ensure consistency of the analysis. The use of
two interviewers allowed the capture of different perspec-
tives. One interviewer took notes during the interview and
posed questions throughout as necessary if something
was missed or required further exploration. This enhanced
the interview data by allowing non-verbal nuances to be
described and noted throughout the interview. After the
interview, the two interviewers debriefed and discussed
ways to improve for the next interview. This technique
was particularly useful in the first interview where much
exploration occurs.
Conceptual Framework
The findings from this case were analyzed using the con-
ceptual framework Accountability for Reasonableness [11].
Accountability for Reasonableness was developed in the con-
text of managed care in the United States, and is a leading
framework for analyzing priority setting. It is an ethical
framework that operationalizes the abstract concept of
fairness, is empirically based, and grounded in theories of
democratic deliberation. According to Daniels & Sabin
(2002), an institution's priority setting decisions may be
considered fair if they satisfy four conditions: Relevance,
Publicity, Appeals and Enforcement (Table 1).
The Relevance condition ensures that the rationales for
the decisions being made are based on evidence – reasons
and principles that fair-minded parties agree are relevant
to deciding how to meet given needs under resource con-
straints. The Publicity condition stipulates that the deci-
sions being made and their rationales must be publicly
accessible. The Appeals condition ensures that a mecha-
nism exists for challenging decisions made and dispute
resolution regarding limit-setting decisions exists, includ-
ing the opportunity for revision of decisions when new
evidence becomes available. The Enforcement condition
ensures public regulation of the process to ensure that the
first three conditions are met.
We used the Accountability for Reasonableness framework in
our analysis to understand the decision-making process
for adopting EVAR in an academic health sciences centre,
since it identifies the conditions for fair process in limit
setting exercises.
Research Ethics
This study was approved by the Research Ethics Boards at
the University Health Network, The Hospital for Sick
Children, and the Committee on the Use of Human Sub-
jects at the University of Toronto. Participation in this
study was voluntary and written informed consent from
each respondent was obtained. All transcripts were kept
anonymous and confidential, available only to the
research team. No study participants have been identified.
Results
In this section, we describe and evaluate the implementa-
tion of EVAR in the hospital. The first part describes two
key decisions regarding EVAR at the hospital: (1) the deci-
sion to adopt EVAR in the division of vascular surgery and
(2) the decision to stop hospital funding for the technol-
ogy. The second part evaluates these findings according to
the four conditions of Accountability for Reasonableness.
Verbatim quotes are used to illustrate key points.
Description of decision-making process
Decision to adopt EVAR
There were two stages of implementation of EVAR at the
hospital. In 1998, sporadic cases were performed accord-
ing to individual patient needs. A Surgeon decided to treat
these initial patients with EVAR because the patient "would
not tolerate a major operation, yet was in severe pain". Eleven
patients were treated with 'homemade' grafts made by
hand for the first patient. The Surgeon explains that "at the
time, there was no graft that was ideal for [the patient]...so my
wife and I figured out how to sew plastic on the flaps of the stent
with a suture." This introduction demonstrated the feasi-
bility of the procedure. The Surgeon had knowledge about
EVAR because he was involved with the development of a
protocol through a specialty medical organization of
which he was a prominent member.
By 2001, two Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved devices were available on the market in the
United States, with approvals for selected stents in Canada
through Health Canada's Therapeutic Products Directo-
rate (TPD). The TPD is the national authority that regu-
lates, evaluates and monitors the safety, efficacy and
quality of therapeutic and diagnostic products available to
Canadians [26].
At that time, EVAR was approved under the hospital's glo-
bal budget, and an additional 85 procedures were per-
formed. A vascular surgeon, who had been trained in the
Table 1: Accountability for reasonableness
Condition Description
Relevance Allocation decisions should be based on reasons (e.g. 
evidence, principles) that fair-minded people can agree 
are relevant under the circumstances.
Publicity Allocation decisions and their rationales should be 
publicly accessible.
Appeals There should be opportunities to revisit and revise 
decisions on the basis of new information and there 
should be a mechanism to resolve dispute.
Enforcement There should be mechanisms in place to ensure that 
fair processes are implemented.BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:182 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/182
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technique, was recruited specifically to develop the
endovascular program at the hospital. He explained that
he agreed to join the hospital because there were appro-
priate funds committed to an EVAR program at the time.
Another surgeon in the department described his initial
experience with the procedure.
"We practiced just watching what we were doing, then we
did it under x-ray control...then we had a couple of experts
come and we did it with them on two patients the next day."
EVAR was offered to patients who were thought to be poor
surgical risks. One surgeon commented that a patient had
a high risk of dying from conventional surgery and there-
fore wanted to perform a procedure that had a low risk.
There was a perception on the part of surgeons that frail
elderly patients and those with co-morbidities would ben-
efit from quicker recovery periods associated with less
invasive surgery.
"The difference in mortality from an open operation versus
[EVAR] is SO huge...the difference between doing open
operations and endograft are astronomical. Mortality rates
are 3% versus 17 or 18%."
The surgeons were confident about the benefits of this
innovation, even though data on safety and effectiveness
were preliminary and only short-term follow-up informa-
tion was available.
When surgeons were questioned regarding introducing
new technologies, they all described their desire to intro-
duce new techniques and innovative approaches in their
practices given the opportunity, particularly given that
they were in an academic centre, which encourages inno-
vation. This was true for the introduction of EVAR which
was an innovative approach that seemed to 'make sense'
for the patient and was therefore adopted within the
department.
The Radiology department was involved because initially
the procedures, which required fluoroscopic control, were
done in the angiography suite. However, after the first few
had been performed, the procedure was moved to the
Operating Room (OR). This move had a greater impact on
radiology since they needed more staff to run their regular
activities as well as attend the OR. There was discussion
between the surgical team and radiology about (1) the
best place to perform the procedure; and (2) who,
between the surgeons and radiologists, should perform it.
Radiology had better imaging capability than the OR,
however, in the event of complications, it was felt that a
patient could be treated more safely in the OR. EVAR was
a politically challenging undertaking, which exposed con-
flicting views between clinicians about endovascular lead-
ership.
Radiologists felt the patient was better treated in the angi-
ography suite and surgeons felt the OR was most suitable.
One radiologist expressed that:
"Nursing services didn't like to have to bring bodies down
here outside the OR, anesthesia didn't like it, the surgeons
didn't like it...people didn't like moving from where they
were...and since there were three of them and one of
us...that speaks for itself."
Differing views about the roles and responsibilities of dif-
ferent physicians were revealed in the interviews. The vas-
cular surgeons felt they were 'held hostage' by radiology.
The conflicting views held by both sides demonstrated
disagreement about 'ownership' of the innovation, and
the willingness of 'competing' providers to communicate
and collaborate. A surgeon commented that:
"A lot of the other practitioners of catheter-based tech-
niques, such as the radiologists, were very unhappy that
someone else could come and do this...they were present in
the operating room but in essence because of the way the
hospital structured it and was unwilling to commit com-
pletely, so we were held hostage by them...In fact, the tech
that worked our machine worked for them and so they could
essentially withhold him, and would if they were not
allowed to actively participate. But in terms of expertise
with regard to endovascular aneurysms, unfortunately, they
did not bring much."
Due to the desire to retain 'ownership' and control of the
innovation, the vascular surgeons were not willing to 'give
up' their patients to the radiologists, who they felt did not
have expertise with management of aortic aneurysms.
Decision to stop funding
In 2004, the hospital stopped funding EVAR, seeking spe-
cific financial support from the Ontario Ministry of
Health and Long-Term Care. The device cost of approxi-
mately $10,000 US was the determining factor, even
though costs of open AAA repair are probably very similar
to the overall cost of EVAR [27]. The hospital, which was
funded by a global budget, was less willing to fund incre-
mental use of a new technology than hospitals funded
under different models, such as fee for service models of
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) as occurs in hospitals in
other countries such as the United States. The vascular sur-
geons were upset with this decision, feeling that the hos-
pital was using the department as leverage to force the
province to pay for the procedure. One surgeon explained
that:BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:182 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/182
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" [The hospital decided to] pull all the endovascular fund-
ing and used the department, our division specifically, as
pawns in a little game or a little tug of war they were play-
ing with the provincial government in trying to gain addi-
tional funding."
It was explained that the decision was strictly 'financial'
due to the high costs associated with the stents. The hos-
pital had decided that their budget would no longer
include new procedures that were not fully funded by the
government. The hospital decision-maker explained:
"This clearly is a very expensive technology. It can be fifteen
thousand dollars just to put in stents for one patient [and
the government] should be funding it...As we were getting
into progressive budget cuts, we decided that realistically it
didn't make sense for us to continue doing it, given that we
decided on a budget policy in the organization that we
shouldn't be doing new things unless they were fully funded
by the government. So this was something we'd already
started doing which wasn't funded by the government."
Although EVAR was already being funded by the hospital,
it was explained that the hospital had just added it on one
year, on an ad hoc basis, and its continued use had to be
re-evaluated. The decision-maker said that it was initially
introduced because a hospital decision-maker at the time
was a vascular surgeon who advocated on behalf of its
implementation. Ultimately, the re-evaluation occurred
due to a prioritization process designed to set the institu-
tion's future goals. The hospital decision-maker
explained:
"I think it sneaked into the organization quite honestly, just
around the time that I arrived here...the person who was
the [hospital decision-maker] at the time was a vascular
surgeon by background. Seeing that it was essential to the
future of vascular surgery, [he] found a way of absorbing it
in his budget but it started to become a financial problem
for us. Plus, when we did our clinical activity target setting
as part of our strategic planning, we actually decided that
vascular surgery was not a real priority for us."
The vascular surgeons were upset by the decision to stop
EVAR. They expressed concern about patients who were
now faced with an increased burden of traveling to
another city for the procedure.
"All the while that this was happening we had a couple of
patients die waiting for aneurysm repairs. We had to trans-
fer patients to [other city] and whereas it might be fine for
you or I to go to [other city] to get treatment, when you're
80 years old, that's not a terribly reasonable thing to have
happen to you because of the logistics of the difficulties
involved. So there were many adverse events that resulted
because of this".
Evaluation of decision-making using 'Accountability for 
Reasonableness'
Relevance Condition
The decision to adopt EVAR was based on two reasons.
First, all respondents stated that their perception of
improved patient outcomes and safety was the primary
criterion for adoption. AAAs are common and their treat-
ment can sometimes result in a hospital stay of approxi-
mately ten days. Less invasive options were preferable,
particularly for patients who had multiple medical prob-
lems, or were elderly and poor surgical risks. One surgeon
explained:
"If you have an incision [and] if you have an aneurysm in
the chest, it may not be obvious to you or to a surgeon who
doesn't work in the chest, because to work in the chest you
have to open the chest which means the lungs collapse,
which means you're working on one lung or less...the whole
middle of the chest can collapse and move and indeed does,
and collapse your other lung so if you open this chest you
only have one lung right off."
Second, due to a drive to innovate, surgeons were eager to
adopt innovations that their colleagues at other institu-
tions were using.
"You shouldn't have to scream every time you need some-
thing and you shouldn't have to have people die in order to
get what would be the standard of care in the rest of the
world to which we aspire to compare ourselves."
A surgeon was hired specifically to perform endovascular
repairs and was instrumental to its early use.
"The thing that really kick started it is when we hired a
partner who had been trained to do this in the US. So he
had done a lot of these cases, and so we then went fairly
rapidly and ramped up the program."
The decision to stop EVAR was based on three reasons.
The first reason was cost. One surgeon explained that the
department "ran out of money early because we had an inad-
equate amount of money to fund the volume of surgery which
we were expected to do." Subsequently, the hospital Busi-
ness Planning Brief Fiscal 2004/05 stated that:
"Pending the results from the Ministry's review of vascular
studies, [hospital] will not be doing any endovascular cases
during this fiscal year unless specific volume based funding
for stents becomes available".BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:182 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/182
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Another surgeon explained the impact this had on their
staff. The surgeon hired to perform EVAR left the hospital
shortly after the budget was cut.
"If you don't give [surgeons] the tools to do their job, they're
going to leave. And that's exactly what happened. [The Sur-
geon] left. They cut the budget, he said 'fine I'm outta here'.
It took him six months and he was gone."
Second, there was concern that evidence to support the
safety and effectiveness of EVAR was lacking. The deci-
sion-maker explained that this was one of the factors that
led to the decision to cut funding, especially since the
ministry didn't view it as a proven therapy. A committee
mandated to advise Ontario's Ministry of Health and
Long-Term Care on the adoption of new health technolo-
gies had recommended against widespread use of EVAR
until long-term follow-up data from clinical trials were
available and recommended that the use of EVAR be lim-
ited to a field evaluation at one site in the province [26].
The hospital decision-maker reasoned:
"We took the position that in a sense it really wasn't even a
proven technology in the view of the government otherwise
why in the world would they evaluate it? It didn't make
much sense for us to be subsidizing out of our base budget
something that the government viewed as not even being a
proven therapy".
Third, through their strategic planning process, the insti-
tution decided that vascular surgery was not a priority.
From this analysis, the decision to adopt EVAR did not
meet the Relevance condition because the reasons sup-
porting its adoption did not involve all the appropriate
stakeholders. The decision of the hospital to stop funding
EVAR did satisfy the Relevance condition.
Publicity Condition
A key hospital decision-maker at the time was approached
by one of the vascular surgeons about the procedure and
agreed it was important. Communication was also made
with the hospital's Research Ethics Board (REB). One Sur-
geon explained that he spoke "to the chief of the [REB] com-
mittee...and I told him everything and what I was going to do.
And he said, 'ok, go ahead'. I just wanted someone to know
about it." This was not systematically publicized through-
out the hospital or the community or to the Ministry of
Health and Long-Term Care. Communication was made
with other departments that were involved with the pro-
cedure (such as radiology) however, this communication
was made after the vascular surgeons decided to introduce
the innovation to the hospital. Patients were informed at
the time of their procedure and were aware that EVAR was
not considered to be 'standard of care'. One Surgeon
explained that "it sort of came by word of mouth because we
weren't out advertising this, out looking for people."
The decision to stop EVAR became known to the surgeons
through communications from a hospital decision-maker
to the head of the Division of Vascular Surgery. The public
was made aware of this decision through hospital com-
munications reporting the priorities of the hospital and
word of mouth that the vascular program was no longer a
priority for the hospital.
The decision to adopt EVAR did not satisfy the criteria for
the Publicity condition since it did not ensure all stake-
holders had an opportunity to engage in the deliberation.
The decision to stop funding EVAR satisfied the Publicity
condition.
Appeals Condition
There was no formal means by which anyone could dis-
pute or appeal the decisions made. Respondents sug-
gested that if there was a concern, they could approach the
Surgeon-in-Chief. There was a conflict between the radiol-
ogists and surgeons regarding which provider should per-
form EVAR. There was no external attempt to mediate this
conflict. The hospital decision-maker became involved
when funding became an issue. When asked if there was
an appeals mechanism when it became apparent that
funding would be cut, one surgeon explained:
"We disputed it at multiple levels including with [Surgeon-
in-Chief], with [CEO], with [Board Chair], with any
Board member that would listen because we thought it was,
in fact, such a travesty. We had patients and...all the while
we were frankly hopeful there would be some sort of cash
infusion. In fact, we ultimately took it to the Ministry when
[CEO] would not act in any appreciable way".
Based on this data, we found that neither the decision to
adopt EVAR nor the decision to stop it satisfied the
Appeals condition.
Enforcement Condition
There was no explicit mechanism or central body respon-
sible for decision-making to enforce any of the conditions
of Accountability for Reasonableness or equivalent concepts.
Discussion
Surgical innovations are driven in large measure by a sur-
geon's desire to innovate and improve health care. Conse-
quently, patients with major medical conditions who
would have been deemed inoperable in the past are now
candidates for interventions due to the decreased risk
associated with some surgical innovations. On the other
hand, patients face risks when new surgical technologies
are introduced. There is a fine line between 'innovation'BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:182 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/182
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and 'experimentation'. Moreover, surgical innovations
may have significant resource implications for individual
institutions and the entire health care system. Therefore,
there is a role for oversight of even well-intentioned deci-
sion-making by surgeons [28].
How a surgical technology is valued by a hospital depends
on many factors. EVAR posed a large economic impact on
the institution. The institution's views on the innovation
and its effectiveness differed from that of the providers.
The conflicting values evident in the decisions made
affected the vascular surgery division, resulting in the
recruitment and subsequent loss of a vascular surgeon.
Furthermore, patients were exposed to a procedure with
unestablished outcomes. Conflicting values existed
between the surgeons and hospitals. Surgeons were inter-
ested in bringing the 'newest' and 'best' technologies to
their patients, and did not describe being heavily influ-
enced by their cost. Hospitals want to provide health serv-
ices within their constrained resources. These conditions
highlight the importance of developing a fair process for
the evaluation of future innovations in surgery.
Accountability for Reasonableness is a framework that has
been used to evaluate priority setting at both the hospital
level and at the level of clinical programs such as cardiac
surgery [29,30], but has not been used to focus specifically
on decisions to adopt surgical innovations at the level of
a surgeon or surgical department.
Accountability for Reasonableness provides an explicit frame-
work to evaluate this process and describe good practices
and recommendations for improvement that can be used
to help inform the development of guidelines to aid deci-
sion-makers in the adoption of future surgical innova-
tions at the hospital level.
The decision to adopt EVAR was driven by a few individu-
als interested in adopting the new technology focusing on
a very narrow range of factors. Communication was made
with a hospital decision-maker and the Research Ethics
Board to inform them of the procedure prior to adoption,
however other departments that were affected should
have been engaged in this process (such as the radiology
department). Communication occurred primarily among
the members of the vascular surgery department. Greater
involvement from administration to identify financial
constraints would have been beneficial to help avoid stop-
ping EVAR once it began. A key hospital decision-maker at
the time was a vascular surgeon, which may have posed a
conflict of interest in the decision. On the other hand, it is
possible that this decision-maker had better knowledge
about the value of EVAR at a time when other stakehold-
ers were less enthusiastic about its value.
A mechanism to ensure competence was used by recruit-
ing a surgeon from another hospital with prior experience
with EVAR. This reduced the learning curve associated
with acquiring a new skill for an innovation [31], presum-
ably increasing the success and safety of the performance
of the procedure. However, according to the Accountability
for Reasonableness framework, the decision to adopt and
the decision to stop EVAR were not made fairly.
The decision to adopt EVAR was based on perceived
improved patient outcomes and safety and the surgeons'
desire to innovate. The decision-making process responsi-
ble for this adoption followed mainly the "medical-indi-
vidualistic" perspective [32] which focuses on hospitals
adopting new technologies based on the clinical needs of
their patient population and the benefit of the interven-
tion for the patient. This decision is driven by the clinician
or hospital medical administrator regardless of whether
economic considerations or other factors suggest alterna-
tive decisions [33]. Greenberg et al (2005) found that
most adoption decisions for new technologies come from
senior physicians, but the responsibility for the final
adoption decisions varies depending on the technology.
For innovations that involve large capital investments, the
final decision was usually made by the hospital's senior
executives, or by ad hoc committees consisting of similar
administrative and medical leaders [33].
There was very little medical evidence available in the lit-
erature at the time, and there were no long-term data
available due to the novelty of the procedure. Based on
the surgeon's desire to help their patients who they felt, in
many cases, had few other options, this was seen as a log-
ical choice and therefore offered to their patients. How-
ever, this decision involved few stakeholders – other
departments that were affected were not engaged at the
time. Furthermore, hospital decision-makers were not
adequately informed, which later had an impact on the
decision to stop funding the procedure.
The decision to stop funding involved all key players and
was based on criteria apparent to all those involved,
including cost, evidence and hospital priorities. In light of
the conceptual framework used in this study, the initial
decision to introduce the technology did not satisfy two of
the conditions of Accountability for Reasonableness, how-
ever, the decision to terminate it did. It is interesting that
a poor process can produce what, in retrospect, appeared
to be a 'good' decision and that a 'good' process does not
guarantee that a 'good' decision will be the result.
Several lessons can be learned from this analysis. In order
to improve the decision-making process, hospitals should
develop a structure for deliberating the reasons for adopt-
ing a surgical innovation. This recommendation is con-BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:182 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/182
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sistent with other studies of technology adoption at the
hospital level where a centralized process should be estab-
lished with a medical director involvement [33,34]. The
process should involve a wide range of stakeholders
including managers, a financial officer from the institu-
tion with oversight of hospital budget, some representa-
tion from the public, community member, department
head and other departments affected to allow the full
range of relevant considerations to be included. Further-
more, broader input should be sought, not solely from
individuals personally invested in the innovation. A 'dis-
interested' person, one at 'arms length' to the advocates of
the innovation, would have the appearance of being less
biased in favour of its adoption.
Hospitals should also establish a formal appeals mecha-
nism for addressing challenges to the decisions being
made [35]. This may have facilitated discussions between
radiologists and the surgeons, improving the quality of
communication between key stakeholders. This should
not be regarded as a dispute resolution mechanism as
much as a mechanism for improving the quality of deci-
sions being made (see Table 2). Structures that currently
exist in hospitals that may act as an appeals mechanism
might include department heads, advisory committees or
ethics boards. While these individuals or groups may
assist in such decisions, their role is not mandated or
structured. To ensure consistency and fairness in such
decision-making processes, it is important to establish a
structure that can address such issues for surgeons and
their teams.
Our study has several limitations. The results from this
case study represent findings from an academic health sci-
ences centre, which may not be generalizable to smaller
community hospitals. The goal of qualitative research
however, is to provide a rich description of a context-spe-
cific phenomenon derived from empirical research. It
would be useful to study different types of surgical inno-
vations using the same framework and in different set-
tings. The small sample size may be considered a
limitation, however, we interviewed all the individuals
who were involved in the process at the time and those
who had experience with the innovation. This small
number represents all the key players as identified
through our sampling strategy.
A challenge presented throughout the interview process
was the respondents' recall of past events, and their per-
ceptions at the time of implementation. Since we were
asking opinions of events that occurred several years ago,
some of the recalled details may be inaccurate. We did,
however, obtain consistent information from the different
respondents, in addition to document analyses that cor-
roborated information from key informant interviews,
suggesting that respondents' representations were valid.
Conclusion
We described and evaluated the decision-making process
for the adoption of a new surgical technology for the treat-
ment of abdominal aortic aneurysms at a large, university
teaching hospital in Toronto, Canada. Several recommen-
dations were made to improve the decision-making proc-
ess involved in adopting surgical innovations in hospitals.
Results from this case study may apply to similar settings
where a formal process for decision-making does not exist
and where conflicting pressures such as professional
autonomy, budgetary constraints, and strategic organiza-
tional planning affect individual surgeon's decisions and
practices. We are using these empirical findings and obser-
vations from other case studies, analyzing a spectrum of
surgical innovations of varying magnitudes across com-
munity and academic hospitals, to develop a framework
for a decision-making process for the adoption of surgical
innovations in Canadian hospitals.
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